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Section 1. The Role of Short-TermRates
Short-term interest rates play a prominent rolein manybusine cycle theories. This corresponds to theirgreat signiflcaifl the national money markets. There is furthera widespread beliefthat among economic quantities they areexceptionallyexposed to international influences and that theirmovements may frequenuy
produce favorable or unfavorableconditions abroad.For that reason they are frequently included in studiesof foreignexchang. Their role was undoubtedlygreat during the classicalperiod of the gold standard, i.e., between1871 and 1914. It istherefore impera. tive that we study their cyclicalbehavior. In thischapter we show the behavior ofsome typical series, andprepare the groundfor further operationsto be carried out withthem insubsequent chapters.
Short-term interestrates are highlysensitive toinstitutional changes. Some ratesare operationally importantat one time, but of merely historicalinterest later althoughthey may still bequoted. It is thereforeimportant to findout when such breaksin their significance occur andto what theyare to be attributed.Often this cannot bedetermined ina satisfactory manner; ifthis happens then we mustat least exercisegreat reserve ininterpretation. The ratesare determined bya number of elementswhich need not be identical inall countries.Among them themost important are the supply ofmonetary fundson the money marketsand the willingness of businessto borrow at theprevailing rates. The former isinfluenced by thereserve position of thebanks, the movements of gold, andthe actions ofthe central bank,if one exists. The latterare the result of theinterplay of littleunderstood forcesoperating throughthe "expectations"of businessmenand thecomparison ofpresent and expectedfuture profitconditions with thecorresponding conditionsof borrowing. Most of thesedeterminantsare themselvespredominantly de- pendentupon nationalconditions. The linkwith othereconomies was chieflyestablished by goldmovements and shifts ofshort-term
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capital. Policy measures may intervene one way or the other, though
when the strict gold standard was in force they were infrequent
andpossibly--of minor importance.
We do not know, at present, how to estimate the relative sig-
nificance of the domestic and foreign influences. This is a general
dilficulty discussed above in Chapter II which will keep on cropping
up. But it seems likely that the domestic influences outweigh the
others in the case of short-term interest rates; the day-to-day
fluctuations of the domestic economy would affect the domestic
interest rate structure more frequently than the occasional dis-
turbance of foreign origin, because distance alone creates a certain
isolation from minor shocks coming from other economies, when
there are no really large disturbances in any one country. This
would, for example, be true toward the end of a cyclical contraction
and at the early stages of an expansion. If a strong central bank
is supplying ample funds, then there is another domestic factor
frequently overshadowing international influences. So when several
countries are simultaneously in these stages, it is plausible that
the movement and the level of the various short-term rates are
essentially the product of domestic forces. It may be quite differ-
ent, however, when international financial crises occur.
The interaction of short-term interest rates of different countries
therefore need not have been of a stable nature; it may have been
weak in some years, strong in others. We have here an instance
of the possibility of varying cyclical dependence, mentioned briefly
in Chapter I, section 8.
The interdependence of interest rates within each money market
is presumably very great, because of the possibility of translating
a long-term rate into a series of successive short-term rates, e.g.,
by repeated borrowing or lending.' Because of this systematic
interrelation of interest rateswhich isaffected also by other
factors than the one just mentioned, e.g., by variations of risk
among short-term and long-term ratesit is permissible to speak
of an interest ratestructure,even if its properties are far from fully
known.
To avoid misunderstandings about the scope of the following
'Cf., for example, F. A. Lutz, 'The Structure of Interest Rates," Quarterly
journal of Economics, Vol. LV, 1940, pp. 36-63. For general interest the im-
portant work by F. B. Macauley, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by
the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices In the United
States since 1856, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938, may also be
referred to.
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observations on interest rates it is emphasized again thatthis isno
a study of the function of interest, its influence upon theallocation of durable goods, its control of investmenton money andcapital markets, etc. These arc far-reaching problems. Weaim mainlyat description of a few interest rates and theircomparative, inter.
national behavior.
If it were our aim merely to geta picture of themovement of interest rates, i.e., of their cyclical behavior,it would probablynot be very important which short-term,medium-term, andlong-term rates we chose. The members of a given classof ratesmove closely
together. But other considerationsenter into our selections.One of themto be discussed in ChapterIXrelates to the absolutelevels of rates in differentcountries. In measuring suchdifferences in level the comparability ofrates is highly important.
Our data cover two main periods,the first from February1878 to August 1913 (426 months),the second fromNovember 1925 to December 1938 (167 months).In some of the subsequenttables and measurements differentperiods, i.e., parts of theabove, are occasionally used; the technicalreasons for such deviationsare noted on eachone of the tables or in thetext. There is notablya subdivisi0of the postwar datafor the period ofthe moreor less general applicationof the goldor gold exchange standard.
We now formulate thecriteria for the selectionof the short-term interest rates. Whatinformation dowe expect our interestrates to give?
First, we are primarilyconcerned with cyclicalbehavior. Hence oux interest ratesmust be representativeof the category ofshort- term rates as faras movement is concerned.






























since they should be continuously fulfilled for hundreds of months,
i.e., taking possible institutional changes into account. This latter
condition is especially hard to meet after World War I, even during
the few years of the gold standard. But fortunately the task is not
hopeless, if a reasonable latitude of view is adopted.3 Then it turns
out that the internationally significant rate is generally one of
great domestic importance too and hence relevant to the cyclical
behavior of all short-term rates.
Thus we find that the contacts among the large money markets
are multiple: The domestic factors influencing the rate of interest
such as monetary policytransmit repercussions to other na-
tional markets by affecting the differentials of the rates, while at
the same time the domestic rate is subject to influences from
abroad, because this rate is in turn exposed to similar repercussions
emanating from the other centers.
The rates selected were for the United States the commercial
paper rate and the New York call money rate; for GreatBritain
the London open market discount rate; for France the Paris open
market discount rate; and for Germany the Berlin private discount
rate. A brief description of these five will be found inthe appendix
to this chapter.
Section 2. Frequency Distribution$
It is of interest to investigate to some extent the frequencydis-
tributions generated by the interest rate series, even though our
chief concern is with their cyclical properties. Frequency dis-
tributions are often neglected in cyclical studies, but theyhelp
us to gain a deeper insight intocyclical behavior by showing some
basic properties, almost of an institutional character. Weneed,
in any case, to know the average standof the different rates,
especially in Chapter IV, when the question of absolutelevels of
rates enters into the picture.
In this first instance we determine thefrequency distributions
for both the seasonally uncorrected and corrected series(Tables
9 and 10). This comparison itself brings out someinteresting facts
which otherwise might be overlooked. For thereader who is in-
from country to country, though they may in each caserelate to somewhat
different institutional conditions.
* For the United States we shall even consider two interest rates, in order

















































































































































































































Postwar Period, Januaryl925-December 1938
N.Y. Great Brstajn France Berlin, Germany commerjnJ N.Y. callopen marketopen market private Class paper ratemoney ratediscount ratediscount rate discount rate
variation
terested in it, this gives at the same time a check on the nature of the
seasonals and on the consequences of their elimination.
Beginning with the New York commercial paper rate (prewar
period), we find only slight differences between the arithmetic
means-4.84 per cent (uncorrected) and 4.87 per cent (corrected)
-and the medians-4.83 per cent (uncorrected) and 4.86 per cent
79
0-.O.39 6 2
0.40- 0.79 87 10 57
o.8o-L19 21 56 20 9 1.20- 1.59 11 11 1 16 1.60- 1.99 6 20 2.00- 2.39 5 10 12 20 2.40-2.79 7 9 7 20 2.80-3.19 8 1 15 44 3.20-3.59 4 2 1 23 9 3.60-3.99 20 11 9 6 27a 4.00-4.39 23 18 31 9 3 4.40- 4.79 7 8 14 3 18 4.80-5.19 3 6 1 6 10 5.20-5.59 8 2 8 4 3 3.60-5.99 2 1 4 6 5 6.00-6.39 6 2 1 0 9 6.40- 6.79 2 2 14 6.80-7.19 4 2 8 7.20- 7.59 1 1 5 7.60- 7.99 1 5 8.00- 8.39 1 8









1 188 168 168 168 168 Ifs 447.160 464.380 409.560 518.360 804.760 If 1109.444200 2127.8322001559.7402001980.7322004363.788200
Añthinetic mean 2.66% 2.76% 2.44% 3.09% 4.79%
Median 2.62% 2.04% 2.13% 2.78% 4.42%
Standard deviation 1.76% 2.24% 1.83% 1.51% 1.74%

























N.Y. Great Britain France
commercial N.Y. call open marketopen market




0.80- 1.19 12 29 2 2 1.20-. 1.59 31 36 32 1.80-1.99 48 47 84
2.00-. 2.39 46 69 105 2.40- 2.79 4 35 59 125 2.80- 3.19 11 52 63 63 104 3.20- 3.59 25 37 53 28 3.60- 3.99 45 41 34 13 51 4.00-4.39 66 38 31 9 4.40- 4.79 69 29 19 2 14 4.80- 5.19 75 22 6
15 5.20- 5.59 81 19 2 g 5.60- 5.99 39 11 1 7 6.00- 6.39 24 8 1 8.40-. 6.79 13 6
6.80-. 7.19 6 7























0.40 0.26 0.29FREQUENCY DiSTRIBUTIONS
(corrected).4 It is not of course to be expected that seasonal
adjustment will affect the general level of the series;it may
however reduce the series' variability, and the standarddeviations
indicate that this happens: they are 1.10 per cent(uncorrected)
and 1.01 per cent (corrected). This reduction invariability is still
more marked in the NewYork call money rate. The arithmetic
means of 3.72 per cent (uncorrected)and 3.71 per cent (corrected)
are substantially lowerthan those for the commercial paper rate.
This is not surprising in view of the nature of the tworates (e.g.,
in the matter of collateral, duration ofloans, etc.), but even this
American rate is considerably higher thanthe average of the
highest European rate. This point will reappearlater (cf. Table
26).
The coefficient of variation5 o/X is almost three times ashigh for
the call money rate as for the commercial paperrate (uncorrected
data). With the elimination of the seasonalsthis difference becomes
smaller. But it is true of all the rates in Table 9that the elimina-
tion reduces the coefficient of variation,the standard deviation of
which is 2.52 for the uncorrected seriesand 2.19 for the corrected
series in Table 10. The New Yorkcall money rate and the Berlin
private discount rate showed the greatestreductions.
Before the war the French openmarket discount rate had the
lowest mean and median, the NewYork commercial paper Tate
the highest. In the interwar period,the British rate was the lowest,
both the Paris and Berlin rates risingrelative to prewar, the latter
now becoming thehighest. The two New York ratesaveraged lower
than before the war.
The sensitivity of the rates, as indicatedby the standard deviation
and coefficient of variation, showedthe New York call money rate
the most sensitive before World WarI, the French rate the least
sensitive; this latter evidenceof greater stability of theFrench
economy will reappearfrequently in this study. Even in the interwar
period this relationship continued,6although all rates varied more
than before 1914. The British rate wasthe second most sensitive
in both periods, evidenceof its central position in theinternational
4These are obviously very line distinctions.Their value dependsas in the
following instanceson the accuracy ofthe basic data. It is possible that it is
not very good, but error estimates arenot available.
This coefficient is usually writteniOO(a/X), i.e., expressed as a percentage,
instead of a ratio. In order not to confusethis percentage with the unit of the
interest rate, which is also apercentage, we use the ratio form.
Except that the Berlin coefficientof variation became the lowest.
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money market, as a focal pointfor major Jinancial infiuencfrom
abroad.
Section 3. Seasonal Variations
Now we turn to a brief examination of the seasonal variations
of our interest rates. Here we touch upon an important and tricky
question. There are many methods by which to calculate and
eliminate seasonals. Frequently this is done in an altogethertoo
mechanical way. Criteria of what constitutes a satisfactorysmooth
ing are for the most part merely qualitative, even visual,which
are quite inadequate in view of the deep-lying problems in-
volved.7 The merits of each method must be judged fromthe
problem on hand and from the properties of the series.Sometimes
it may be doubtful whether seasonals should he eliminatedat all,
depending on the use to which the corrected anduncorrected series
are to be put.8 If it is a question, e.g., of comparing therelation
of turning points of various series, and if seasonalcorrections shift
the original turning points to different monthsas they often do,
then a very troublesome situationmay arise. It is hard to make
general decisions, if not impossible.
For that reason we shall sometimesuse corrected data, some-
times uncorrected, oreven both. This will be determined by the
needs of the occasion. An importantaspect is also the speedofthe
repercussions which may occur betweentime series. Finally there
is the vast and largely neglectedfield of the interdependenceof
seasonal variations of differentactivities. This is of importance
in international financial affairssince, for example, the seasonal
harvests of onecountry cause seasonal changes inthe exchange rate and interest rate ofanother county,e.g., Argentina, Great
Britain. Similar interdependenceis found domestically.
The seasonal variationsof our interest ratesare best characterized
by their indexes Chart4 and Table 11.Considering first theprewar period we notea common property: Therates are generally highest
during November andDecember, lowest in Juneand July. There
are exceptions to this over-allpicture which showat the same







time a certain amount of instability, provided the indexes are ac-
curate. These are of two kinds. First, there is the exceptional July
value for France for 1882-1898, the exceptional June value for
Germany for 1884-1895, and the exceptional April value for the
United States call money rate for 1898-1911; they might be due
to an imperfection of the method or of the data. Second, there is
the greater parallelism between the British and French and between
the German and American indexes. The latter are frequently below
100 in the first three months of the year while of the first pair
there is only one small instance (March for France, 1882-1898).
There may not be anything deeper behind these relationships; at
least we have not been able to find any clear reasons for the
groupings, and the two correspondences may be due to chance.
However another phenomenon is definitely not random and of
greater significance: it is the difference between prewar and post-
war indexes for all countries. The change can be seen in thetotal
deviations as well as in the distribution of the monthly deviations.
We know what caused the shifts andfor Germany and the United
Stateseven the entire disappearance of seasonal deviations after
1928 and 1929 respectively for the commercial paper rate (1931
for the call money rate): it is the greater control over the money
market exercised by central banks and treasuries. This is achieved
either by direct contraseasonal intervention, or by the deliberate
creation of an abundance of short-term credit at certain periods
of the year, or both. From then on these institutions could do
as they pleased regarding seasonal variations,and since the latter
are generally consideredundesirable the decision was obvious.
It will be noted that the decrease in seasonals and their final
disappearance in some instances coincides with the period of a
weakened application of the principles of the gold standard (with
the gold exchange standard in some cases) and their final abandon-
ment from 1931 onward. But from this it does notfollow that a
strict gold standard requires wide seasonal fluctuationsof interest
rates. Agreements between central banks caneasily be reached
to abolish them within the givenframework.
There exists a connection between the seasonals of these series
and those of the exchange rates which ultimatelyreflect seasonal
activities in foreign trade. This is particularlythe case if we have
an industrial country onthe one hand and an agricultural one on
the other and if these two are trading directlywith each other








































Seasonal Indexes of Short-Term Interest Rates,
























































































Uncorrected data used for 1932-19.39.
SHORT-TERM iNTEREST RATES
TABLE 11
Seasonal Indexes of Short-Term Interest Rates
Total de-
viations219 164 110 96 125 182 208
1914-1934- 1925-.1932- 1925-1931'
19331939 1931 1938
Jan. 100 87 106 92
Feb. 101 85 100 110
Mar. 99 94 96 113
Apr. 96 97 92 114
May 95 94 90 112
June 95 118 89 121
July 100 100 93 99
Aug. 101 97 101 90
Sept. 102 98 102 85
Oct. 104 104 106 84
Nov. 104 96 113 89


































































































































U.S. Commercial Paper Rate
U.S. Call Money Bate
'Starting April 1919.
'Starting May 1924.
















1933b jVo3 ioo 89 100 111 94 101
Feb. 98 90 88 90 103 88 99
Mar. 100 96 102 96 107 89 101
Apr. 100 111 94 95 89 101
May 89 91 94 89 91 89 98
june 84 87 82 87 86 89 96
july 82 91 92 93 90 98 96
Aug. 103 103 114 98 94 111 97
Sept. 109 110 127 110 104 114 101
oct. 113 113 113 114 105 118 104
Nov. 111 111 95 112 106 115 104
Dec. 108 114 93 117 109 106 103
Total de-













Jan. 121 96 113 92 96 95
Feb. 91 78 77 97 104 97
Mar. 120. 94 98 95 100 94
Apr. 115 94 104 90 97 94
May 87 88 78 87 96 99
June 71 71 73 95 103 102
July 64 74 78 95 101 100
Aug. 68 100 65 91 92 99
Sept. 90 123 92 107 94 105
Oct. 111 120 101 112 107 105
Nov. 121 127 141 120 107 98
Dec. 133 131 113 119 103 112
Total de-
viations 204 202 271 116 50 48S SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
to which this is reflected depends on the quantitiesiflvolvcl
on the degree to which their ecoflornies are interlockJ.o
Section 4. Domestic Cyclicalehavior
After the elimination of their seasonalvariations theSpecifr cycles are determined for our fourrespective interestrates'o A can he seen from Chart 5 and Tables 12 and 13, thereare niarke
cyclical fluctuations often withconsiderable amplitiide.
occur in all series, but the rhythm is differentfor theVariots countries. Before specific cycles are examined,thequestion must be raised whether thereare fluctuations other thanseasonal cyclical.
First, there is the question of long-runtrends. Theseare, as is well known, of great rarityin interest rates, butthere is at least one instance here which vi1l bemore fully dealt with inChapter IV, i.e., the United Statescommercial paper rate. Thetrend isa weak influenceon monthly data, and if thespecific cycleswere determined froma series where the trend hasbeen eliminated in the traditionalmanner,'1 it wouldProbably haveno influence upon the turning points of interestrate cycles, whichare our only interest at present.
Second, randomfluctuations areconsidered in theprocess of selecting specificcycle turning points.This is done ina qualitative way on the basis ofknowledge about theinstitutional, historical background of theseries. It must beadmitted thatsometimes, especially in a studyof internationalrelationships, randomdis- turbances can heextremely importantand more revealingthan the ordinarycycles.
Third, theremight conceivablybe minor cycles,which are swallowed up by thespecific cycles.According to thedefinition of a specificcyclet2 certainminor fluctuationsarc not taken into account. As a rule theyare not verynoticeable. So it is withthese interest rates. Ourpurpose is tocompare their cyclical behavior. flw seasonalvariatiotis of our interestrates arc nuy tiniesas large as those of the six exchange
rates between thefour coulntrjq.sCf. Table 42 and the accompanying discussion.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number and Duration of Specific Cycles of Short-TermInterest Baof Four Countries, Seasonally Corrected Datj
AVERAGE DURATION OF'
(months)
Expan- Cont rac-FullExpan- Contrac-j1
sions lionscycles' slons lionscycles
NUMBER OF:
92
Prewar, February 1878-August 1913, 426months
Great Britain 8 8 7 84.9 17.5 52.6 France 9 8 8 29.6 20.0 47.5 597 Cermany 11 10 10 20.5 17.9 38.6 53A U.S. commercial
paper rate 12 11 11 20.2 15.9 38.6 56.0 U.S. call money
rate 12 11 11 19.1 16.5 38.2 53
Postwar, January l925-December1938, 167 months
Great Britain 3 4 3 11.3 30.7 39.7 26.9 731 France 4 3 100 - . io.o a3.2 41.6 3&4 Germany 2 2 2 2.3.0 51.5 74.5 30.9 ,i U.S. commercial
paper rate 3 3 2 12.0 33.3550 26.5 73.
'Thiration. of only completecycles, expansions, andcontractions are included in theirre. tive columns
b Thepercentages are calculated froma base equal to the average durationof espansionj that of contractions. Thissum is equal to the average durationof cycles only whenthe nuinie of full cycles is thesame as the number of expansionsand contractions. 'Only complete cyclesare counted; parts of cyclesat both ends of a seriesare dmppej Cydr are measared from troughto trough. Similarly onlycomplete expansions andcontracti counted in theirrespective columns.




SPEj-. cyDOMESTIC CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
TABLE 14
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Short-Term Interest Ratesand
Their Respective Reference Cycles
Four Countries
call money rates in parentheses while theunbracketed figures refer
to the commercial paper rate.
Beginning with the prewar period, wefind notable differences
for the four countries. There are 7, 8, 10, 11,(11) cycles respectively
for Great Britain, France, Germany,United States. Their average
duration necessarily varies, and in this case in inverseorder to the
number,'3 from the maximum of 52.6months to 36.3 (36.2) months.
There are more cycles than referencecycles (cf. Table 6), Great
Britain and the United States eachhaving one more full specific
cycle, France two, and Germany four morethan reference cycles.
This does not mean necessarily thatthe correspondence between
the specific cycles of the short-term rateswith their own reference
cycles would be found highest in theUnited States, and lowest
in Germany (cf. Table 14).
The difference among countries inthe average length of full
specific cycles is considerable. It istherefore noteworthy that the
differences among the duration ofthe contractions is not nearly
'3This need not be so, of course, sincethe periods covered by complete cydes









Expan- Cant rae- DIFFEFENT
sions tfonsTotal PHASE
(percentages)
Prewar, February 1878-August 1913, 428 months
Great Britain 234 111 351 75 54.9 27.5 82.4 17.6
France 207 142 849 71 48.6 33.381.9 18.1
Germany 192 157 349 77 45.1 36,981.9 18.1
United States 155 106 261 165 36.4 24.9 61.3 88.7
U.S. call money 177 142 319 101 41.5 33.3 74.9 25.1
Postwar, January 1925-December 1932, 96 months
Great Britain 10 50 80 36 10.4 52.1 62.5 37.5
France 35 41 76 20 36.5 42.7 79.2 20.8
Cennany 33 39 72 24 34.4 40.6 75.0 25.0
United States 39 51 90 8 40.6 53.193.8 8.3
U.S. call money 28 47 75 21 29.2 49.0 78.1 21.9SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
so great. It varies only between 15.9 months (United States)
and 20.0 months (France), while the values for Great Britain
and Germany are practically identical: 17.5 and 17.9 months.
a consequence the dispersion of the average duration ofexpansio
is much greater. No relationship of this sort could heobserv
for the reference cycles of the various countries.
The average per cent duration of the two phases (addingup to
100), computed from the above figures, shows forGreat Britain
almost twice as long upswings as contractions of theshort.ter
rates; this is a more marked version of the same relationship
found in the British reference cycles. In all countries,however the
expansions were longer than the contractions. In theabsence of trends this has to be interpreted as indicating thatgradual rises of rates were briefly but sharply interruptedby steep fallsof rates. The long rise and sharp fall (bestseen from Chart 5)seems to be a characteristic of freely moving short-termrates.
The post-war situation is widely different.The periodcovered is much shorter, and the three full cyclesfor Great Britainand France and the two for Germany andthe United Statesare too
few from which to obtain significantaverages. But in spite of the
necessary caution we can point out thatnow the average percent duration of contractions is largerthan that ofexpansions. The figures for Great Britain and theUnited States (commercialpaper rate only) are almost identical; bothshow the greatestproportion of contractionover expansion. It is clear whatthis general shift means: on the one hand therewas a drop from the exorbitanthigh rates in a country like Cermanyas an after-effect ofa lost war and inflation;on the other hand therewas the deliberate policy of reducing interest rates,coupled with a genuineincrease in liquid funds in the UnitedStates, especially in thel930's, anda lack of demand for commercialpaper. In some instancesthe policy of depressing interestrates was eveninternationally coordinated by understandings reachedamong central banks. Whilethe postwar reference cycles hadalso shownsignificant changes in duration of the whole cycleor parts of it, theywere not nearly as pro- nounced, and there themeaning is quite different.
France occupiesa somewhat singularposition in the general picture, Although theretoo the reversal ofthe relation between the average durationof the two phasestook place, itwas narrowly limited (41.6per cent forexpansion and 58.4per cent for contraction). Even beforethe war therewas comparatively little difference betweenthe shares ofthe two phases(59.7 and 40.3
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per cent). The French rate, as we know from the frequency dis-
tributions (ef. Table 9), had not only the lowestaverages hut also
the second smallest coefficient of variation of all of them (in the
prewar period) and this would tend to be reflected in our present
statistics. We do not want to attribute too much significanceto
these figures, but it will be seen later again and again that French
financial affairs in many ways showed greaterautonomy of move-
ment than those of other countries.
It is important now to study the behavior of the short-term in-
terest rates relative to the reference cycles of the same country.
We want to find out whether the conformity of movement, i.e.,
of turning points, is the same in all four countriesor whether any
significant differences emerge.
Table 14 contains the result of the comparison. The figuresex-
press, either in months or percentages, how the reference cycle and
the short-term rate were or were not simultaneously in the phase
of expansion or contraction.14
For the prewar data it is found that the three European countries
show the greatest total covariation between the respective national
reference cycle and short-term rate. The values, 82.4 per cent, 81.9
per cent, and 81.9 per cent for Great Britain, France, and Germany
are almost identical. For the United States we get less correspond-
ence: 61.3 per cent (74.9 per cent). That the call money rate
has greater covariation is noteworthy especially since in the post-
war period just the opposite was the case. The great role played
by the call money rate in the United States before 1914 is well
known and this is partly reflected in better correspondence of
movement.
The post-World-War I data need be dealt with only briefly. This
is partly justified by the much smaller sample,'5 although the re-
sults vary far more than could be attributed to this difference in
samples. Very large changes took place, an indication of the
enormous influence the war exercised. It seems safe to assume
that it is not only a post hoc but a propter hoc.
The American commercial paper rate, which before the war
In the following sections the correspondence of the movement of pairs of
short-term rates will be investigated. It is clear that if two rates correspond
well to each other and each shows a high degree of covariation with its
respective reference cycle, then we have also high covariation between the
first interest rate with the reference cycle of the second and vice versa, i.e.,
there is transitivity in these relationships.
The significance test of section 2 in Chapter II applies the necessary
changes to the present situation.
95a
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showed the least correspondence,afterward was in thesame Phase with American reference cyclesin not less than93.8 perCof all months. For the callmoney rate the improve,neincorfl. spondence is minor.
Most interesting is the change forBritain after thewar. There we find the lowest instead of thehighestcorresptdefl.625 per cent, just slightly higher than thelowestewar figure(61.3 per cent, United States commercialpaper r..tte). But theinteresting fact is that only.10.4 per cent (out ofa total of 62.5per cent) of all the months forwhich the Britishshort-term ratesand British reference cycleswere in the same phase,were they bothexpand. ing (before 1914: 54.9per cent out of a total of82.4 percent). This is inagreement with all other series;while before1914 ex- pansion dominated withoutexception, contractionnow domjnatj The mosteven distribution of thecorrespondence betveenthe two phases is for Germany.
To some extent leadsand lags affectedthe degree ofagrceme The New Yorkcommercial paper ratetends to lagbehind the United Statesreference cycle. TheNew York caimoney rate showed sometendency to lagat the peaks before1914, vher after World WarI it tendedto lead at the peak.In thepre-Worid. War I period theLondon short-termrate tended to leadthe refer- ence cycle at thetrough, while the Parisrate lagged at thepeak. It would beinteresting to discoverwhether thecomplete reversal betweenagreement in expansionsandcontractions was dueto central bank policyaiming at reducinginterest rates duringbusi- ness depressions (atleast doingso faster or earlierthan before) and keepingthem stable duringbusinessexpansions. Thiswould tend to loosentheconnection betweenreference cyclesand these Specific cycles.
As pointedout elsewhere,short-term interestrates have played a large role inmost businesscycle theoriesand are stillconsidered of importancethough decreasinglyso. For the periodof the classi- cal goldstandard theywere often heldto be of primarysignifi- cance, notably inthe earlierwritings of R. 0.Ilawtrey. Now it is clear thatduring theprewar period insimilarCountries, similar interest ratesbehaved differentlyat differenttimes and inrespect to thenational businesscycles.18Increasing thenumber of cycles If we hadtaken theamplitudinto ac(1J,Intthe diversitywould have
shown upstill more. The
coefficient5 ofvariatiol) make thislear. Cyclical amplitudes wouldShOW thesame.
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generally available for establishment of a theory to 36 (before
1914 but 46 up to 1938) does not make easier theoretical inter-
pretations.
On p. 52 it was pointed out that a strong probability of inter-
national transmission of the fluctuations as shown by reference
cycles might be inferred from the maintenance of a high degree
of parallelism when there was an alternation between short and
long cycles. This worked only for the European countries.
The same question arises now about specific cycles. Chart 5 and
Table 12, showing the specific cycles of short-term interest rates,
indicate the same conclusion, with certain limitations. To begin
with, the good correspondence does not really set in before 1892.
Then the first trough of a short specific cycle begins, the cycle
lasting to the next trough in 1894-1895. In this case even the
American cycle is in step. The next cycle is long, lasting to 1901-
1902; the three European countries are again in high correspond-
ence. Then a short specific cycle isfollowed by one more long
specific cycle. When the American cycle is in agreement with the
others, it is quite clearly a phenomenon of mere coincidence, be-
cause in general it seems to follow its own,quasi-independent
rhythm.
The measures of concentration and dispersion of turning points
below (pp. 110 if.) make these statements sufficiently accurate,
without however showing fully the change in pattern here men-
tioned. The case is not nearly so clear as for the reference cycles;
this is an interesting observation, in consonance with the fact that
the international covariation of short-term rates is not so marked
as that of the reference cycles.Apparently these rates are very
delicate and therefore sensitive to many different influenceswhich
come both from several other countriesand from purely local
conditions. Thus they do not give much indication of anydirect
influence of one national rate on another. There may howeverbe
a very powerful interaction workingthrough a separate medium
and involving other economic quantities. If this be the case it may
even be unwise to look for repetitionof the pattern of the reference
cycles, because dissimilarity rather than similarity, or atleast
systematic displacement in time, might have to beexpected among
these rates.
This concludes the comparison of the cyclical behavior ofshort-
term interest rates with the reference cyclesof their respective
countries. A certain degree of covariation was tobe expected,
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because interest rates in general shouldbe givensome weighti obtaining the average which constitutesthe referencedates. But the covariation is high, thoughit differs among theCountries and was subject to sharp modification after thewar. Thedifferences were probably much larger than could beattributed todiflerences in the institutional setup. Thereremains the possibilitythat these interest rates in the various nationswere not independentof each other. There may havebeen influence ofone on the otherand vice versa. Such internationaltransmission is notobvious,i.e., it cannot simply be read off fromour charts. On the otherhandwe know in a generalway about the interlockingof moneyand capital markets.
The reader will recallwhat was said inChapter 1, section8 about the possibility thatsome parts of the nationaleconomy aremore closely related to thesame or other parts of othereconomies than to different spheres ofthe nationaleconomy. This possibilitywill be explorednow; it will crop up repeatedlyin later chapters.
Section 5. InteruotionolCovariation
We now takeup the direct phasecomparison of thecycles of our short-term interestrates, first forgroups of countriesand then for the six pairs,in the samemanner in which referencecycles were compared in ChapterII. Our discussionshould be readin the light of theresults obtainedthere and withthe significance test of section 2in mind. Justas was then thecase, high or low covariation does notin itself meananything for thewider question of transmission.There could simplybe parallelismwithout inter- action ofany kind. Clearlyeven if purely randomfactors could produce a highparallelism of thereference cycles oftwo countries, we would be boundto get someparallelism of theconstituent series, if thesemove at all incorrespondence withtheir reference cycles. That theydo somove was justdemonstrated. Soour sub- sequent analysisneglects at firstthe problemof transmission.But it will then haveto be decidedwhetherwe have independentbut similarmovements or not.












features emerge which,while difficult to interpret, are unmistakable.
They possibly point toward elements of astructural relationship
which only a very extensive statistical studycould fully reveal. This
feature lies, as we shall see, inthe great uniformity of the per-
centage of the numberof months in which some of the countries
aresimultaneously in the same phase, notably in contraction.Our
measurements so far are insufficient toelucidate fully such a
possible structural relationship, since theyhave not taken care of
amplitudes nor sufficiently of the difficultproblems of the absolute
levels of interest rates in differentcountries.1T
The total phase correspondence-asshown in Table 15, which
is based on Table 12-isdefinitely high. The four countries taken
together are in the same phase in48.6 per cent of all prewar
months. If the call money rate isused, the figure drops to 42.7
per cent. Omittingthe United States altogether, the percentage
'TAs stated before, we shall return tothese matters, especially in Chapter IX.
TABLE 15
Phase Comparison ofSpecific Cycles of Short-Term InterestRates
February 1878.-August 1913, 428months.
bNovember 1925-June 1938, 151 months.
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1. All three expand
2. All three contract
3. All three in same phase(1 +2)

















Total 426 100.0 151
Four countries
5. Three European countriesexpand, United
States expands 134 31.5 10 6.6
8. Three European countriesexpand, United
States contracts 39 9.1 0 0.0
1. Three European countries contract,United
States expands 12 2.9 8 5.3
8. Three European countries contract,United
States contracts 73 17.1 42 27.8
9. Three European countries in samephase,
United States in opposite phase (6 +7)
















100.0 100.0 151SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
S
TABLE 15, continued
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Prewar Short-Terni Interest
i
for Groups of Countries, February 1878-August 1913. 48montl1,
rises to 60.6. Of this, 20.0 per cent is accounted forby contraction.
This agreement was somewhat lower thanthat for the reference
cycles (cf. Table 3).18
In the postwar period radically differentresults obtain. Taking
first the period November1925-December 1931, all fourcountries
are in the same phase 27.4 per cent of themonths and the three
European countries show thesame correspondence, 27.4 per cent.
This percentage is thesum of equal Components, of expansion and
contraction 18.7 per cent, in bothinstances. Use of the callmoney rate weakens thecorrespondence still further to 24.7per cent. If the postwar periodto June 1938 is used, thecorrespondence rises for all fourto 34.4 per cent and for thethree European
countries to 39.7 per cent.
The percentagescompared by pairs ofcountries in the prewar
period vary from themaximum of 79.6per cent for Great Britain-
France to the minimumof 641 per cent forthe United States-















France 232 107 339 87 54.5 25.1 79.6
Great Britain-
Germany 194 109 303 123 45.5 25.8 71.1
France-Germany183 117 300 126 43.0 27.5 70.4
U.S.-Creat Britain205 103 308 118 48.1 24.2 72.3
U.S.-France 186 103 289 137 43.7 24.2 67.8
U.S.--Gennany 158 115 273 153 37.1 27.0 84.1
United States call money rate
Four countries 120 62 182 244 28.2 14.6 42.7
U.S.-Creat Britain187 97 284 142 43.9 22.8 66.7
U.S.-Francc 164 95 239 167 38.5 22.3 80.s
U.S.-Ccrrnany
U.S. call money-
153 123 276 150 35.9 28.9 64.8
U.S. commercial
paper 178 131 309 117 41.8 30.8 72.5INTERNATiONAL COVARIATION
Gennany.19 In view of the generallyknown interaction of the
British and French money markets thishigh percentage might
be expected. We would hardlyassume a similarly close connection
between the American and Germanmoney markets. In the first
case there may have been much interaction, with sufficientlyrapid
transmission of effects between the twocenters to cause parallel
movements. In the second casewe have no particularly good
intuitive reasons to assume a similarly high degreeof interaction.
There would therefore simply be theexpectation of a parallelism
based on the belief that parallelmovements occur in similar
countries. Such a view would seem natural because ofthe already
noted similarity of the reference cycles of thesetwo countries.
For the longer postwar period,up to June 1938 (151 months),
the size of the sample is twice that of the shorterperiod through
December 1931, though even the larger sample isnot much more
than one-third of the prewar. The changes fromprewar to post-
war are so considerable that they can be attributed to influences
other than the size of the sample; theyare furthermore consonant
with the preceding discussion.
The total covariation was considerably lesstaking the smaller
sample firstthan in the prewar period,except for the United
StatesFrance, where it is 87.7 per cent (Table 16),or 19.9 points
higher than prewar and thus not only the highestpostwar covaria-
lion (even if the longer period up to 1938 is also considered) but
the highest in all periods. We have pointed outa similar phenom-
enon for the reference cycles of this pair of countries (cf. Table 4)
and have noted that there was little known about post-World-War
I economic relations, which would account fora highly parallel
movement between them. This holds for the general business cycles.
But short-term interest rates are presumably highly susceptible to
international influences, so that the repetition of the correspondence
here is noteworthy. The correspondence between Great Britain
and France on the other hand, which with 79.6per cent was the
highest before 1914, fell after the war to the second lowest and
insignificant position of 50.7 per cent, only somewhat better than
the United StatesGerman covariation of 45.2 per cent, which is
below the 50 per cent probability level. It is not difficult to at-
tribute to this change a real meaning in the light of thereasons
for the high prewar correspondence and its profound disturbance
"Confrast this, however, with the quite divergent ranking of the correlation
coefficients of Table 21.
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TABLE 16
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Short-TermInterest Rates,
for Groups of Countries, November l925-Deeeinber1931, 73month
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31 46 27 20.5
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paper rate 21 32 53 20 28.8 43.8 72.6INTERNATIONALCOVARIATION
TABLE 17
Phase Comparison of Specific Cyclesof Short-Term InterestRates, Postwar for Groups of Countries,November l925-June 1938,151 months
Extending the postwar period of observationto 151 months thus
leads in general tomore parallelism, though not as muchas for
the prewar period. However, theimprovement over the results for
the 73 months must not be attributedto the size of the sample,
because of the obvious break in theinstitutional background against
which our statistics must beseen. We do not know whether there
were similar but hidden events during theprewar periods, which
we consider homogeneous. At presentwe shall continue to assume
homogeneity, which we infer principally fromthe fact that the
principles of the gold standardwere applied and were violated only
to minor degree (chiefly by the central banks throughapplication
of the "small means" of gold policy,see Chapter VIII).
In one respect the extension of thepostwar period is genuinely
revealing. That is the change in distributionof the total per-
centages between expansion and contraction. Contractionis with-
out exception overwhelmingly predominant,even more so than
was the expansion in the prewar period. It is questionablethat,
this is due merely to the fact that the depressionsaveraged longer
after World War II.
There remains a remark on the substitution ofthe American
commercial paper rate for the New York callmoney rate. We note
first the covariation between these series themselves.It is not veiy
















15 66 81 70 9.943753.6 46.4
Germany 20 91 111 41) 13.2 60.373.5 26.5 France-Germany 20 59 79 72 13.2 39.152.3 47.7 U.S.-Creat Britain 16 86 102 49 10.6 57.0 67.5 82.5 U.S.-France 32 69 101 50 21.2 45.766.9 33.1 U.S.-Ceimany
U.S.-Great Britain-
20 78 98 53 13.2 51.764.9 35.1
May 1920-June
1938 (217 mos.)23 108 131 86 10.6 49.860.4 39.6,
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
and postwar: 72.5 and 72.6 per cent. The great interdependence of
interest rates in the same money market (especially when both
are short-term) would have led one to expect much higher per-
centages. In the light of this the values for the rates of markets
of different nations assume greater importance.2° If the callmoney
rate is included in the four-country comparison, values decrease.
The same was true before the war for the covariation of France
and Great Britain; also in the postwar period. The relationship
(and its change) between the two phases is maintained. We add
the measures for the call money rate because of a need for it later
(cf. Chapter V) when, in the study of the interaction ofmoney
markets, we come across the argument that this rate rather than
the commercial paper rate provided the link with foreignmar-
kets.21
From seasonally uncorrected data we have computed thecorre-
iation coefficientsfor the short-term interest rates of our six pairs
of countries (Table 18)22 Uncorrected datamay be expected to
give higher correlation coefficients than corrected data (ifvery
successfully corrected), if the seasonal movements affect thetwo
time series simikrly This need not be the case,e.g., when the sea-
sonal movements of one seriesare the exact opposite of those of
the other. Table 11, which shows the seasonal indexes forour
series (which we know must be cautiously used) should be
consulted in on with Table l& The long period covered
and the fairly frequent changes of the indexes probably reduce
the significance of the seasonal movement.
Another point of much wider interest deservesmention here.
Seasonally corrected series sometimes show peaks andtroughs
in places differing by one to several months fromthose of non-
corrected series. This may occur for two seriesinversely if their
Besldes the rates of diff&ant countries are n* Identical, In regard
to the t,pe of traneactiori to which they relate, but only"Imilar; this would uou -
Part Cl the different results for the callmoney rates arises froni its lead
Over the cianmerdal paper rate,psrticeluzlyatthep
Th time covered IsighiIy Mf.t from that used earlier. But thisIs
immaterial. The number Of menths, 463, isa little larger than the other, which
is 426. These are, Indeed, vy large zausbers for ounelaticicoethdenti and
such differences disappear fully. At any ratewe ha'e deterinbied the cuifldeaice
limits In all these cues. For methods used, d. ILCramer, Mdheesagici,J Meth- ods of Seetlet1943,_pw-4I1 bw enpItlo. of coe6denoe limits forerdatim eo#&4'i' and ft A. Fisher, StetI1Method, for ResearCh
Worker,, 10th Ed., 1943, Chapter vi TabJaiv for 1-distethution and Table v-B
for tnun&mmetloanb.tw,,uif and,.iNTERNATIONAL COVARIATION
TABLE 18
Correlation between Short-Term Interest Bates,
Seasonally Uncorrected Data
For confidence coefficient of 99 per cent.
peaks or troughs are very near but do not coincide. In that case
there would be a considerable shift and less phase correspondence
than if the uncorrected data had been taken. If a comparison is
made between the covariation of phases on the basis of seasonally
corrected data, and correlation coefficients are computed from un-
corrected data, the correlation coefficient may give a different re-
suit because of the absence of such shifts (aside from other in-
fluences operating toward variation of results). The seasonal cor-
rection of our short-term rates has, to be sure, frequently led to
temporal shifts in peaks and troughs, but mostly in those minor
fluctuations which occur between the turning points of specific
cycles. Thus there would be no influence on covariations of cyclical
phases. The issue becomes of importance only when highly sensi-
tive actions and reactions are studied.
The correlation coefficients provide an ordering of the various
pairs of money markets. In view of the length of the series each
one must be considered significant, and a significance test for their







Prewar Period, January 1876-July 1914,
London open market rate-Berlin private discount rate
463 months
+0.730.610.78
London open market rate-Paris market discount rate+0.670.600.73
Berlin private discount rate-Paris market discount rate+0.620.540.69
N.Y. commercial paper rate--London open market rate+0.450.350.54
N.Y. commercial paper rate-Berlin private discount rate+0.400.290.49
N.Y. commercial paper rate-Paris market discount rate+0.360.250.46
Postwar, January 1925-December 1938,
London open market rate-Berlin private discount rate
168 months
+0.840.770.89
London open market rate-Paris market discount rate+0.340.150,50
Berlin private discount rate-Paris market discount rate+0.13 -0.07 +0.82
N.Y. conunercial paper rate-London open market rate+0.930.900.95
N.Y. commercial paper rate-Berlin private market rate+0.770.680.84
N.Y. commercial paper rate-Paris market discount rate+0.340.150.50
N.Y. call money rate-London open market rate +0.840.770.89SHORT-TERM iNTEREST RATES
top of the scale for the prewar periodwe find Great Brjtaj_
Germany with +0.73, followed by GreatBritain_Francewith 4-0.67. This sequence is the inverse ofthat found byour phase
covariations (Table 15). This is repeated forthe next twocountries Here we have Germany-France,+ 0.62, followed by UnitedStates_ (commercial paper rate only)-QreatBritain, +0.45, whichis a wide gap. The total phasecorrespondence shows much lessvaria. tion. The smallest degree of relationshipis indicated forUnited States-France, +0.38.
For much of the time after WorldWar I thereare no seasonal
movements in our series, so theconsiderations aboveconcerning their common influence donot apply. The order of thecoelficiefib now change, placing New York-London(for thecommercial paper rate) definitely first with0.93. The main result isthat the Londo. Paris relation has fallenvery low, the other coefficientsshowing lack of correspondence.
Table 19 givesa sign correlation of thesame series. The tech- nique used in the followingcorrelations amountsessentially toa
TABLE 19
Sign Correlation:Short-Term InterestRates of FourCountries Correlat
Prewar and Postwar
Period Palsofcu,j N Z
lag toC Dec. l87l-JuIy 1914Great Eritain.Fmnce 511 283.5 0.02< 0.030.110 3 Jan. l876-July 1914Great Britain_Germany 462 271.0 0.00< 0.0001 0.173 1 Jan. l878-JuIy1914 France_Germany 462 257.5 0.02<0.030.115 2 Dec. 18(39.-July 1914United States_GreatBritain535 296.0 0.02< 0.030.107 4 Dec. 1871-July 1914United States_France 511 274.5 0.12<0.130.074 6 Jan. 1876-July 1914United States_Germany 462 251.5 0.08<0.090.089 5
Jan. l925-Doe. 1938Great Britain_France 16792.5 0.21 <0.22 0.108 5 Dec. 1924-Dec. 1988Great Britain_Germany 1(3893.5 0.18 <0.190.113 4 Jan. 1925-Dec. 1938Germany_France 16785.0 0.83 <0.840.018 6 Dec. l924-Dec. 1938United States_GreatBritain16896.5 0.08 <0.090.149 3 Jan. 1925-Dec. 1938UnIted States_France 1(37102.0 0.01 <0.0010.222 2 Dec. 1924-Dec. 1938United States_Germany 168 107.0 0.01<0.0010.274 1 Nnumber of pairs ofdifferences observed Z = number oftimes change ineach series showedsame sign (a zero changeis counted as one-half).
pprobability thatan observed deviationfrom theexpected value as greator greater is due to chance.
Ccoefficient ofcovariation
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modified form of the familiar chi-square test. it was developed
for the purpose of this investigation by A. Wald and has a number
of advantages over the ordinary chi-square tcst, chief among which
is that of easy computation. The method is described in the foot-
note.
Letnbe the number of time points at which two economic variables x and
y areobservedLI.e., we have the observationsx1,...,x. and y, .,
Consider the two sequences of differences:
X*Xt, X1XL, ...,
'F y, - yi,s - ...--
From (1) we derive the sequence
(2)
where z = 1 if sigmim (y + =signum (riri). If this does not
hold, thenzL= 0. (We exclude the case that any of the differences* -
and x.+ 1 Xmight be zero.)
Hence
Let
For largenthe statistic z is normally distributed if the observations on xand y
form two independent random series.
SinceEZL=we have EZ

















It can easily be shown thatour coefficient of covariatC
closely related to the familiarmeasure
vx2 T=N
where N is the number ofobservations2l of differences between
successive original data, i.e., exchange rates anddifferentials. Ccan vaiy from 1 to 1. T isa frequently used convenientmeasure of contingency (1'2 is knownas the mean square contingency) de-
veloped by Tschebycheffand Yule.
It should be noted that,since both the sign correlationand the phase comparisonmeasure only the direction of themovement of
a series, they are more closely related thaneither is to the coefficient
of correlation, whichcompares corresponding absolute figures oftwo
series, regardless of the directionof the movement.
As can be seen froma comparison of Tables 18 and 19, theagree- ment is about thesame for the two correlationmeasures, the only
significant shift being in theNew York relationships andto a lesser
extent the Paris rate for theprewar years.
We shall have furtheroccasion to discuss some correlationco- efficients andcompare them with othermeasures of certain time
series.some like those employedhere. The lattertopic is more vital to our themesince it more directlyinvolves probable causal
relationships betweeninterest rates. Here theinterdependence be- tween the series isassumed to bea possibility without any hy- pothesis as yetConcerning how it operates. Thequestion must be left open, whether thedetermination of cyclicalcovariation, which stresses only turningpoints and duration ofcycles and phases, necessarily leads tomore divergent results than doesordinary cor- relation. If sucha disparity does arise,as is the case here,a deci- Sion must be madeas to which of thesemeasures to prefer. Clearly we are more interestedin the cyclicalaspects and must therefore be inclined to viewthesemeasures as more adequate. Thisrefers to specific cycles, i.e.,fluctuations more nearlyof the length and amplitude of the generalbusiness cycle.Correlation analysison the other hand takesinto considerationalso those 1)ossiblvminor cvcks which by thedefinition of thespecific cycleare discarded. Two series may havestrong opposite trendsbut closely harmoniotisphase correspondence This wouldreduce the correlationcocfflcints hut
The n- 1 in footnote 23 equals Nin the fonnula for T,since n refers to the original series.
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TABLE 20
Sununaryof Reference Cycle andShort-Term Interest RateCorrelations
London- London- Berlin-New York'- New York'- NewYork' Berlin ParisParisLondon Berlin Paris
Three European
countries Four Countries Reference cycle phase comparison-prewar' 88.1 535 postwar' 45.2 35.7 Short-Term interest rate: phase comparison_prewar' 60.6 48.6
postwar' 39.7 34.4
'Commercial paper rate.
Per cent in agreement.
yield good covariatfonpercentages. Or, the specific cyclesmay
be similar, but one series alonemay have a trend.
The matter of trends is ofsome importance here, especially for
those pairs where the Americanrate enters. Table 18 shows that
the three prewar correlationcoefficients involving the United States
are substantially lower than those for the threeEuropean pairs.
This may be attributedto the fact that there is a downward trend
in the Americanseries and nothing like it in the European data.
This then may explain whywe have the lowest correlation co-
efficient for the pair United States-France(less than one-half of
the highest coefficient) buta phase correspondence (for both
phases) of 67.8per cent, which compares with the highest per-
centage of 79.6 and is higher than the lowest of64.1 per cent.25
For the sake of conveniencesome principal measurements made
thus far, includingsome of Chapter II, are summarized in Tables 20
and 21. They requireno further comment since they give a corn-
The French rate showed the least regularityin its downward movement,
experiencing many upward movements while the UnitedStates rate was drop-
ping, thus making fora low coefficient of conformity.
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Reference cycle phase compai-
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postwarb














































Summary of Rank Ordering, of Reference Cycle,and of
Short-Term Interest Rate Corrclatjons
ThPJOHATION (_.)
REL&T!ON, 1879..1914 1879-1914 1925-1938 l925-ij
Ref. 8R0RTTERM Ref. SHORT-TEIthI
INTEIT RATEccleE.Esr RATE c11C18 INTERL%T MTh p phase p ose p pile_se
corn-corn- corn-Corn- COIH-corn. pat. pan-signcorr,pan-pan-signcorn.pan-pan.. sonsoncorn.coeff.sonsoncorn.coeff.son SC)?)co,vcci4
London-
Berlin 1 3 1 1 5 1 4 2 +
1 3 2 2 5 5 4.5
Berlin-.
Paris 2 4 2 3 4 6 6 6
New York-
London 4 2 4 4 3 2 3 1 +- ++
New York-
Berlin 5 6 5 5 6 4 1 3-+ ++
New York-
Pans 6 5 6 6 1 3245+
Not significant (0.99confidence regions oerlap).
prehensive picture of thepairwise behavior of the fourgreat finan- cial centers with whichthis work isconcerned. It will gradually become clear how dicultit is to establisha ranking of the degree of interaction betweenmoney markets.
The finalmeasurement is the determinationof the dispersion andconcentration of specific cycleturning points (Tables 22 and 23). The methodused was explainedin Chapter II,pages 65ff., where it was appliedto reference cycles;our present measurements should becompared with those ofTable 7. The calculationscover- ing the period Julyi876-September 1913are for the four countries, twice using thetwo Americanrates, and for the threeEuropean countries. The periodis substantiallythe same as that of the other
110
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computations. Such differencesas there are arise fromthe fact that turning points are notnecessarily foundat the very firstor very last months for whichwe have data.20
In interpreting Tables22 and 23, thereader is rernjndof the discussion in ChapterII, pages 53 if.It is importantto guard against excessiveinterpretation, especiallyregarding the possibility of deriving internationalturning points ofshort-term interestrates. On the other hand thetables reveala considerableamount of in- formation, especially ifviewed togetherwith those for thereference cycles. We can alsoreconsider somequestions that were raisedin Chapter II, merelyon the basis of generalexpectations, about the greater or smallerconcentration and dispersionof peaks and troughs. It will furthermorebe desirableto compare the incidence of the average peaksand troughs withthat observed before.21We shall consider only theprewar conditions, therebeing too few cycles after World War1.
The comparison forall fourcountries is made twice, becauseof the substitution of theAmerican commercialpaper rate for the call money rate in thesecond case.
In the first casewe have an unbrokensequence of average peaks and troughs fromOctober 1882 to June1913. The first peakin October 1882 shows thehighest dispersion(even including refer- ence cycles of Table 7) with8.50 months. Thefollowing average trough of February_March1886 has amean deviation of 5 months, the largest of thatgroup and the second largestmean deviation of both peaks andtroughs (for thecommercial paper set of data). The smallestmean deviation for allextrema is for August 1893 with 0.38 months. Thisis a date andeven a year that does notoccur as a reference cycle date inTable 7, but thereis no doubt that in 1893 therewas a very sharp internationalfinancial crisis which shows up well here.The same observationmust be made for other dates and this leadsus back to the argument,tentatively expounded in pages 96ff., of thepossibility of someautonomy of both financial and internationalpeaks and troughs whichare not revealed by the reference cycledates. Theyear 1893 is certainly oftenmentioned by historians ofbusiness cycles andnot only in relation to the
solitary Americanpeak of January of thatyear.
Note in particular theslight difference In regardto Table 7. We hope the reader will concur withus that it Is not material.
This will supplementour study of the covariation of theinterest rate specific cycles with theirrespective reference cycles, carriedout above
111TABLE 22
Short-Term Interest Rates. Concentration and Dispersion of
Specific Cycle Turning Points, July l878Septernbcr 1913,
422 months
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
Average mean deviation ofcoinciding peaks as per cent of
corresponding average for troughs
Four countries__including UnitedStates commercialpaper rate 80% Four countries__including UnitedStates call money rate 73%
'Coinciding turning points:no opposite turning point withinthe range of turning points.









Four countrjesjnclud. Feb.-Mar. 18865.00
ing United States corn- June-July 1892 1.25
mercial paper rate Jan. 18953.63
Oct. 1901 4.3.8 3.50 62
Dec. 19042.75
Feb. 19094.00
Four countries.includ June 18921.38













Four countriesinclud- Oct. 18828.50
ing United States com- Sept. 18904.50
mercial paper rate Aug. 18930.38




Four countriesinclud- Aug. 18903.50
ing United States call July-Aug. 18930.75







European Short-Term InterestRates, Concentration and
Dispersion of Specific CycleTurning Points, July
I878-September 1913, 422months
COINCIDING PEAXS
Average mean deviation of coinciding peaksas per cent of
corresponding average for troughs
Three European countries 83%
tCoinciding turning points: no opposite turmng pointwithin the range of
turning points.
The aritlunelica] mean of the coinciding turningpoints is computed. If the
average falls exactly between two months, bothare reported; if it falls more
closely into one month, only that monthis reported.
Excluding 1879, the averagemean deviation = 3.44.
The mean deviations of otheraverage peaks are likewise small,
July 1903 (1 month) and February1900 (1.25 months). These
values are notably less than those for reference cycles,and from
1895 on eachone is smaller than the deviation of the correspond-
ing trough. Thuswe have for the entire series I) = 2.79 months
and D1= 3.50 months. This bears out an expectation raised on
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confirmed, i.e., that there would be greater dispersion aroundthe
troughs than around the peaks. The opposite was true of reference
cycles, but the proposition holds for short-term interest rates.
This is of considerable interest because it is plausible toassume
that interest rates of different countries react more sharplyon each
other when there is financial tension, i.e., when ratesare high,
than in times of low activity. The lower turning pointsmay there-
fore depend much more on domestic business conditions(and
domestic economic policies, if any) than theupper turning points.
If we exclude the somewhat exceptional values for1882 and 1886,
we obtaini= 183 and 15= 3.20, a more marked ratio than
before.
There is at least one drawback to this besides theobvious one
of smallness of numbers: thereare the low values of p/P = 68per
cent and t/T = 62 per cent. The latter is identicalwith the re-
spective figures for reference cycles, the formerreference cycle
ratio was 71 per cent. No correctionor addition of any sort is pos.
sible of course, since this is merelya question of the wealth ard
poverty of data.2 Yet we can makea test, by looking at the second
set of figures, computed for the callmoney rate.
This gives one average peak andtrough less. There isan unmis-
takable tendency for theaverage peaks to occur earlier than when
the commericalpaper rate was used. The averagemean deviation
for peaks is now only2.36 months, for troughs 3.20 months,which
is identical with the previousfigure after elimination of1886;
otherwise it is 10per cent smaller. From this and the otherdata
of Table 22 (notably the lowvalue p/P= 59 per cent) it cannot be
decisively argued that thesubstitution of the callmoney rate im-
proves the picture very much. Asmentioned elsewherewe would not have made this substitutionhad it not been for thecontention that the callmoney rate wasbefore l914moreimportant for the regulation of flows ofshort-term funds to and fromthe United States. If this weretrue we would expect to finda higher cyclical
correspondence for it-.--providedthat short-termrates between countries where theproper rates have been chosen doshow high cyclical correspondence.The one neednot entail the other.
In the prewar period thepeaks and troughs of thefour short-term interest rate cycles alwaysfollowed those of thefour reference cycles. This lag, however,was less marked for the threeEuropean countries, particularly in thetroughs.
DThe absolute numberof turning points is largerin the case of interest rates.
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We have, however, onemore argument in favor of the assump-
tion of a genuine interaction betweenour interest rates, made on
page 52. There it was stated that, if there isinvariance of a high
degree of covariation betweentwo or more time series against an
alternation of short and long cyclesin any or several of the many
combinatorial complications, then thereis every reason to exclude
the possibility that this covariationwas not due to interaction. In-
spection of Charts 4 and 5 will show conditionshere. We do not
establish a particular measurement of the degreeof this occurrence.
We have it in the measure of coinciding peaks andtroughs. If it is
high, and if at the same time short and longcycles alternate as the
dates of turning points of the specific cycles(Table 12) disclose,
then the conditions for makingour claim are given.
Such alternation of short and long specificcycles exists: those
from 1892 to 1897 were shorter than those following,up to 1908,
when at least one more short cycle occurred.As usual the length of
the American cycles is much steadier, i.e., theyare generally shorter
than the European. So the alternation of shortand long specific
cycles is again chiefly a European affair.Hence the transmission
hypothesis looks more acceptable for these three thanfor all coun-
tries or for any pair which includes the Americanrates of interest.
As to the satisfactory expression of the phenomenonjust men-
tioned by our measures,a qualification is needed: if we have high
concentration of turning points with low mean deviations, there
might still be exceptions which could fall preciselyinthose regions,
where a change over from short to long cycles (Orvice versa)
occurred. The ratios p/P and t/Tassume therefore added sig-
nificance. The higher they are the better isour argument sup-
ported.29 Tables 22 and 23 have shown fairly good values for these
ratios and better ones still for the European countries. However
we still need further evidence for interaction.
The alternation of short and long cycles forour interest rates
should be compared with that of the reference cycles, if itoccurs
in both instances, it need not be in thesame order. Not even the
exhaustion of all peaks and troughs by theaverage peaks and
troughs is a guarantee for that. So we can makesure only by actu-
ally comparing the years in which the various turning points fall.
Much has been said about this implicitly alreadyon p. 96 when
comparing our interest rates with their respective reference cycles.
There was complete exhaustion of all available peaks and troughs for the
three European reference cycles.
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We conclude this chapter by making five separate remarks
which either take up points already raised or point to subsequent in-
vestigations which will subject our data to different approaches and
place them in close relationship with data of other activities in the
international financial sphere.
First. At the beginning of this chapter we raised the important
question, for the first tinie,3° whether the absolute level of short-
term interest rates, its changes, or its cyclical behavior were more
strongly subjected to domestic or to foreigii influences. It was then
stated, on general credibility grounds, that the domestic factors
might be the more important. In this most economists would
probably concur, although perusal of the literature does not dis-
close anything decisive. There is one important exception inthe
literature_though it does not cover the entirerange of this prob-
lemthat is, the study of the interdependence of short-termin-
terest rates with exchange rates. This subject willOCCL1us more
fully than in any previous discussion (cf. ChaptersV and VIII).
Second. There is the larger question of institutionalhomogeneity
throughout the period covered, that is, thequestion whether the
behavior of the data shows significantvariation revealing such
changes in the institutional backgroundas were not already taken
into account in the selection of theparticular interest rates, and
discounted in our continuoususe of them. Such a break actually
occurs and conforms with that observed for thereference cycles.
It happens after WorldWar I. The break exists, however,whether
the observationsare restricted to the short period of thecontinued
application of the principles of thegold standard orare extended
beyond that period. Thecausation is naturally complicated, the
war as such having little to do withit directly. In fact itwas more
the emergence ofstate intervention with interestrates and all those
international factors in the fieldof capitalmovements and foreign trade which producedless synchronizedcyclical behavior. This craving for greaterautonomy on the part ofmany states has become
a permanent feature of theyears since World War I and villhave to be referred torepeatedly.
For that reasonour study must place chiefemphasis upon the period up to 1914. Theimplications of thisinstitutional change for the validity of thevarious theories of thebusn55 cycle and of
Cf., however,page 24 if. where the probleniof separatiiig hnnttic and foreign influenceswas put in generalterms and wherecertain ticep-lying methodological difficultieswere pointed out.
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international trade are clear. Further reference to this is made in the
fifth remark.
Third. There is the question of the absolute levels of the interest
rates. Tables 9 and 10 disclosed considerable differences in their
absolute levels and in their variability. The problem is whether
these differences__chiefly of the absolute levelshave any close bear-
ing upon their covariation. Again this question cannot yet be an-
swered. There is however an interesting phenomenon to note: the
American call money rate is more nearly at a level corresponding
with that of the other (foreign) rates. Yet its agreement with the
three European rates over the cycle is decidedly less than that
shown by the commercial paper rate, as far as covariation is con-
cerned. But this complex of questions awaits study of the ampli-
tudinal behavior and in every way transcends, at the level at which
it has to be carried out, the scope of this investigation. Some aspects
of the question whether the principles of interdependence of inter-
est rates, both short-term and long-term, require that they vary
only within certain rigid limits are dealt with extensively below,
especially in Chapters V and IX.
Fourth. Closely connected with these points is the set of problems
arising from the study of the differences between short-term interest
fates. Realizing that the rates will not in general be identical with
each other, it might be possible to assign to their differences cer-
tain maximum values. If there is to be interaction between the
rates, it would have to take place through shifts within these maxi-
mal ranges. All this would further be tied up with induced and au-
tonomous movements of other factors, such as capital transfers,
exchange rates, etc. These latter in their turn depend in the range
and frequency of their fluctuations upon limits imposed by the rules
of the gold standard to the extent to which they are or are not
adhered to. All this will form the substance of a large part of the
subsequent investigations, which will throw some light upon the
problems of covariation and transmission.
Fifth. On page 21 if. we have touched upon the question whether
the cyclical behavior of economic activities in various countries
is sufficiently similar to warrant the establishment of a uniform
theory of economic fluctuations applicable to any or all countries.
Whether the answer is yes or no in general will not depend entirely
on one field alone. As far as interest theory is concerned, we should
like to question whether such a theory exists in the shape compatible
with the facts described above. There is a large field of verbal, even
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quasi-metaphysical, discussion above the "nature"of interest,etc., and there is a very much smaller numberof investigationsshowing the behavior of the principalrates over long periodsin the lead. ing Countries.
It may be helpful at thispoint to summarize themore impoItant specific findings of the chapter.
As a general rule, theinternational peaks andtroughs indicatcJ by the referencecycles are present in theshort-term interestrate cycles, although foreach of the fourcountries there tendedto be more cycles in the interestrate series. Unlike thereference cycles however, the short-terminterest rate peaks tendto show lessdis- persion than the troughs.The four countries donot have thesame number of cycles, theUnited States havingthe greatestnumber. Before World WarI the British rate showedthe best phasecor- respondence with its referencecycle whereas afterthe war itwas the poorest, theUnited Statescommercial paper ratenow showing the bestcorrespondence The Britishrate also showedthe best phasecorrespondence with therates in the other threecountries before thewar although not in theinterwar period.Before World War I the UnitedStates rate showedthe leastagreement with the two continentalcenters, much less thandid the threeEuropean centers with each other.Expansions were longerthancontractiom before 1914whereas theywere shorter in theintenvar period. Using frequencydistributio5 togauge the relativestability of the rates, thevariation for theUnited States callmoney rate was much greater thanthat of thecommercial paper rate,particularly before WorldWar 1. TheBritish ratewas the most unstableof the European rates,and thisinstability, i.e.,variability, increasedin the interwarperiod, evidenceof thetension under whichthat economy was laboring.The stabilityof the Frencheconomy before 1914 was reflectedin its short-terminterest rate showinga variance less than thatof GreatBritain andGermany. Ingeneral seasonal variations decreasedafter WorldWar I. Before 1914 theUnited Statesrate was the highestof the four whereas in theinterwar periodit was thelowest.
Appendix. Descriptionof theMonthib, Data
Un ited States.Here we choosethecomnercjal paper rate.3' This Sources: Seconda,,source, Macaulay,op. cit., Table 10;priniary sources, Financji4 Reviewand Conime,jand FhmncklChronicle Macaulaystates that these twosources are practicallyidentical.
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was one of the most important Americanshort-term rates, at least
up to 1914, at which a large volumeof domestic and foreign busi-
ness was transacted. The term applies to promissory notes"on
which merchants and manufacturers borrow money for use in the
ordinary course of their business. No stock or bond collateral is
deposited to secure the loan?'32 After 1914 the notes were admitted
to rediscount at the Federal Reserve banks under certaincondi-
tions. Up to 1923 the rate applies to endorsed commercial paper
("prime double-name paper"); in the late 1920's the endorsement
dropped out of use.
The maturity of the paper was, up to December 1923, sixty to
ninety days and thereafter the rate relates to paperhaving a ma-
turity of four to five months. The tendency was toward paperwith
longer maturities.84
The commercial paper rate is what its name implies. It hasde-
creased in importance in the course of time, but more so in the
post-World-War I period rather than before 1914, toward which
our main interest is directed. Itwould be most important for us to
know what the share of international transactions outof the total
was. Unfortunately no data atall exist about this. We return to this
matter below (cf. Chapter V).M
Besides the commercial paper rate, we shall also consider to some
extent a second American short-term rate,theNew York call mone,
rate.The reasons lie In the disagreement as to whether this rate or
the commercial paper rate was of greaterinternational significance
for the shifting of funds, chiefly between NewYork and London,
NMacaulay, op. cit., p. A-344.
NThis point may seem of small significance in thecharacterization of our
series, but it will be seen below, Chapter V. that it assumesgreat importance.
In order to have the characterization in one place, we mentionthis fact here,
though it is not immediately significant.
"Statistical procedure: the monthly rate is in generalthe average of the
weekly rates. If a Saturday occurred on the first orsecond of the month, the
week ending on that Saturday was considered asentirely in the preceding
month. If a Saturday occurred on the fourth, fifth, orsixth, the week was con-
sidered as entirely In the later month. If It occurred onthe third, the week's
average was considered a quotationfor half a week in the earlier month and
half a week in the later month.
In times of major disturbances the averagemonthly rate is an average of
daily rates rather than of weekly averages. Cf.Macaulay, op. cit., p. A-350.
As for the literature, we mention besidesMacaulay and the standard de-
scriptions of the New York money marketsuch as M. C. Meyers, B. H. Beck-
hart, J. C. Smith, and W. A. Brown Jun.TheNew York Money Market, 4 vols.,
New York, 1931-1932, the work by Albert 0.Creef, "The Commercial Paper
House In the United States," Harvard EconomicStudies, Vol. i.x, Cambridge,
1938, a thorough study with an almostexhaustive bibliography.
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and even in theprewar period. The call money rate36is muchmore closely related to thestock market, whichsets it apart frontthe rates chosen for the othercountries where thereis ICSS doubtas their international,commercial significance. '[herate covers"loans to stock or bond brokers,or to investment bankers whoplace in the hand of the lendersstocks or bonds,or both, as collateral.The rate relates to a mixedcollateral which includesindustrialas svell as government securities."3'
Those loansare made for indefinite periods,38to be repaidat call." The rate isan official renewal rate made bythe moneycom- mission of the New YorkStock Exchange ClearingCorporation. In ordinary timessome 95 per cent ormore of the call loans,new and renewed,carry the renewal rate.3° Thestatistical procedureis the sameas for the commercialpaper rate (ef. footnote34). The callmoney rate was alwaysa very importantrate on the New Yorkmoney market. The muchgreater significance ofevents on the New York StockExchange ascompared with anyEuropean countiy accounts forthis. Also itcannot be doubted thatmany movements of funds fromEurope across theocean were oriented by theseevents. But this isnot the sameas being attractedor re- pelled by thechanges and relativepositions of the callrate. In the late l920'sthe influx ofEuropean fundsto New Yorkwas moti- vated by expectedcapital gainson the stock exchangerather than by a differentialof Europeanrates and the callrate. Before 1914 therewere occasionally stilldifferent institutions,notably the joint accounfs.40
Great Britain. Herewe chose the Londonopen market discot rate.4' This rate ischarged for thediscount of bankbills, i.e.,a bill of exchangeissued or acceptedby a bank. Thediscount rates for bank bill5are less than therates charged forfine trade bills.The R
Sources: secondarysource, MacaWay,op. cit., Table 10and Appendix E.; primary sources,1878-1889 Commercj,and FinancEdClironkle. 1890-1919 Financial Rccjew andComml andFinancial Chronicle;1923-1938, Fed- eral Reserve Bulletj.
' Macaulay,op. cit., p. A-337.
TMCf. footnote 33.
Maeaulay, op. cit.,p. A-339
These wereaccounts owned jointly bythe Londonand New York banking houses belongingto one and thesame financialinterests. Moveii of these accounts were very important.
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discounting is done by special discount houses, most of very old
standing. The olficial rediscount rate of the Bank of England,
briefly called "bank rate," applies to the same paper. A very large
volume of business was transacted at this open market rate and the
share of international transactions was always very large and con-
tinued to increase in the period before 1914 in conformity with
London's dominant position in international finance. In the post-
war period the rate was still of great importance, although Lon-
don's position was no longer of this dominant nature.
The maturity of the paper varied somewhat. The Economist
indicates usually that its data relate to three months hank bills;
but in other instances the heading reads: two to three months bank
bills. This uncertainty about the actual or most frequent maturity
does not deprive the data of their value; but it introduces, as was
noted before (cf. footnote 33, a factor which will assume some
importance later.42
France. Here we chose the Paris open market discount rate
("Escompte hors Banque")This rate is charged for the discount
of bank bills, i.e., a bill of exchange accepted by the bank. it is very
similar to the British open niarket discount rate. But there were
no special discount houses in Paris; this was and is a peculiarity of
the London market.44Direct accommodation of business by
banks also played a large role.
'The literature about the London money market is enormous. We indicate
here some important sources, where not only descriptions of this money rate
may be found but also the general setup of the market is analyzed. The order
in which the books are listed indicates their more direct relation to the descrip-
tive side, while from the analytica! point of view it might be quite different.
George Clare, A Money Market Primer, London, 1891, 2nd ed., 1923.
Ellis Thomas Powell, The Evolution of the Money Market (1385-1915),
London. 1915.
F. Lavington, The English Capital Market, London, 1921.
E. C. Peake, An Academic Study of Some Money Market and Other Statistics,
London, 1923, 2nd ed., 1926.
W. T. C. King. Illstoi-y of the London Discount Market, London, 1936.
Richard Sidney Sayers, Bank of England OperatIons, 1890-1914, London,
1988.
a Sources: 1876-1888, Economist; 1889-1908, Statistics for Great Britain,
Germany and France, U.S. National Monetaly Commission, Vol. 21, 1910, and
Economist; Annual Reports, 1925-1938, Federal Reserve Board.
"The literature about the Paris money market is large but not nearly as in-
formative as that for other centers. That is a general experience relating to
French monetary and other economic statistics. They are either completely
lacking when they are available in other countries, or often of very doubtful
quality without any possibility of checking and improving them. On the other
hand there sometimes exist statistics in fields where, in other countries, it is
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Gernany.Here we chose the BerlinprivatedLscovnt rate ("Fri.
vatdlskontsatz").4e This rate is charged for loans, i.e., discount,on
prime bills) that Is, on those of "recognized solidbanks and bankers.
They must be payable ata bank place, i.e., In Berlin or some other
town with a branch of the Eeichsbank. Theymust call for at least
5,000 Marlcs.'T This characterization hasremained essentially true
since 1910 but as In other countries the role ofthe bills of exchange
has decreased in Germany.This was associated with the rise of
the large enterprises in industryand banking and the more direct
aceommodation of business, especially big business, bythe banks.
The private discountrate is comparable to the French and British
rates to a greater exter:in that order.tlianto the commercial
paper rate at New York. But this holds respectivelytrue for the
three European rates. Thevolume of transactions carriedout in
Cermany with bills of exchangewas considerable and a fairly high
percentage of the bills either referredto international transactions
arising from international tradeor became Instruments of capital
movements. A frequently used practice of Germanbanks was to
rediscount these bills in Paris whenthe rate there was lower and
to repatriate them just before they felldue. This was the so-called
'pensioning" of bills.
The duration of the loansvaried from fifty-six days to three
months. This variation is similarto that found above for the other
impossible to obtain any reliablefosn3atlou at alL Seen against th.general background, this makes themvery Fortunatdy Interest rates (and later exchange rates)are generally lecurate but lee C3iepter V,section 7. Rem are SOn)e important works:
Alfred Neymarck Di tOrgsnisstlamSi. Mardsó Fbwncleraen Franca at a téfranger, ParIs,1884.
k Aupetft and co-authors,LGrand. Marchd, F'enci.rs,Franc. (P.1* at Province), Londres, Berlin, Ne.pYork, Pu1912.
Pierre Castes, Lea Gianda Marckd,Financier., Paris, 1922. H. Fischer, Dir Statdu frsorinirthp, Kradi.* 1984. Statistical procedure: for1876-1868 and 1909-1914 theaverage monthly rates were unaputed by theNs4eel Bureau cI EcomomicReseerththe monthly average Is thea of as mowerAdy_quotmiow as themem Fridays of the mimtk Fcc11906 the eriwere utuisd by the ?4atlonsl Bureau: forJ 188G4aluuy 1905s wauber of Thur.. days In the mouth deiembxsd eamohor of qaoladora - for March 1906-December19*was the wanber of £otriatlayi. For1 1968 the wa1Iy averageswere snmadthe Nadonsle Seüass. TMSourcei: 18164910, Dli Rek-' 1875-19 0, 191.1; 1911-1083, Stogl.tlwljea Jahibsi4s Ill, dD.ut.th. R.k* 19844138,WWac.b4t s.d
U.S. National Mcaatary . cli., VoL *1, p 901.DSCftlpfloN OF TEEMONTHLY DATA
We have not been ableto ascertain what theaverage
was, certainly not theaverage weighted for the volume of
transactio,u.*4$
'Satiwicl procedure; The monthlyaverage rite is computed on the basis d average daily quotations him thevarious sources. Th, latter Is theaverage of quotations fat iong-term and sat-termpaper, Le., within the above limits. If mote than one quotation occurred1 either forshort-term or long-termpaper, then the higheot quotation wasuae
The bteretvre about Carmenmonetary organization sInce 1879 Is ample and goumly accurste. We thaiane only a few works that rolate directly
E.VtTh.r die HUt. dcr varach4.dm.i,Zfnaerten and IhT. wechsebeage iL5ism(.Jeer, 19(.
Pburger Die Eurwkkiung des Zdoafws.sin Deutichiand von 1870- 19tS, FrnikMt, 1901
H. Albert, Die p.chlthdIcls. Eistwlckltmg desZMafmssses hi Deutschland von 1896 bIt l9$, I4prlg, 1910
Paul WallIth, ledge zur Cnscliichte desZinsfusses von 1800 bls zur
Cegenwart," J*rbuch flit Nattoedökonomk, Vol. 42,1911, pp. M9-312.
1. Poble1 Di. neonre Ewtscickivng des Zffiifwsei tied desElnfluss des Welt-
krleges aeiciness Stand, Fra'ildurt, 1915.
M. Palyl and P. QuIt*ner, Hmndw&terbuch des Bankwescis,BerlIn, 1933.
4c